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During the annual meeting of the Foucault Circle, Foucault scholars gather to present papers, dis-
cuss texts, and engage in lively conversation about the most recent Foucault scholarship. Often 
the gathering has a theme. The 2012 Foucault Circle in Buffalo, NY, for example, focused on Fou-
cault and prisons. Participants discussed a common reading, documents from the Groupe 
d’Information sur les Prisons (G.I.P.), edited by Kevin Thompson and translated by Perry A. Zurn. 
While the June 2013 conference in Malmö, Sweden did not have an explicit theme, the scope and 
breadth of papers presented was exciting, and the venue was spectacular. This was the first meet-
ing of the Foucault Circle outside of North America, and it was notable for the number of partici-
pants from different countries—indeed, from different continents (Europe, North America, South 
America, Australia). And, while there was still a predominance of philosophers present, the con-
ference was robustly interdisciplinary. The next Foucault Circle will take place June 29-July 2, 
2016 in Sydney, Australia. 
This special section includes three papers (now expanded and revised as articles) that pro-
vide a snapshot of the range of work presented at the 2013 Foucault Circle meeting in Malmö. 
Each author shows that Foucault’s method of critique is subversive and non-normalizing.  
In a lecture he presented at the French Society of Philosophy in May of 1978,1 Foucault de-
scribes critique as emerging within, and as a response to, sociopolitical developments taking place 
in 15th and 16th century Europe. Two defining aspects of the 15th and 16th centuries, Foucault ar-
gues, are “state centralization on the one hand and […] dispersion and religious dissidence [spe-
cifically, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation] on the other.”2 It’s not surprising that this 
restructuring within the state and the church prompts a renegotiation of the relationship between 
                                                        
1 Michel Foucault, The Politics of Truth, edited by Sylvere Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth (New York: Semiotexte, 
1997), 238.  
2 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 88. 
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these two sources of authority within society. This historical shift gives rise to a concern with, and 
the development of, techniques for what Foucault refers to as “government.” For Foucault, gov-
ernment includes but is not limited to the administration of a state and its people by a ruler. It al-
so exists as a more general concern about how to direct the conduct of individuals, on the one 
hand, and manage populations, on the other. Government as a “general problem,” he asserts, per-
tains to “the government of oneself […] the problem of personal conduct, the government of souls 
and lives” as well as to “the government of children,” 3 “beggars and the poor,” “families” and 
“armies.”4 Foucault argues that at this time, one can observe a preoccupation with questions 
about “[h]ow to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people 
will accept being governed, [and] how to become the best possible governor.”5 
Foucault sees techniques for governing originating within the context of the Christian pas-
toral, specifically in the relationship through which persons are guided toward salvation by an-
other or others to whom they subordinate themselves.6 Within this “salvation-oriented” relation-
ship, the subordinate individual must accept certain externally generated truths, such as religious 
dogma; at the same time, she or he is also obliged to submit to, and participate in, “reflective” 
techniques, “general rules, particular knowledge, precepts, methods of examination, confessions, 
[and] interviews,” which persons “deployed” in order to access and reveal the truth about them-
selves.7 As Foucault describes it, both the ultimate truth of salvation and the truth about oneself 
are therefore attainable only by way of obedience—through, on the one hand, internalizing the 
particular teachings and doctrines of the authority figure and, on the other, by submitting oneself 
to that authority in order to produce the “special and individualizing knowledge of individuals.”8  
Foucault is describing here the process through which one is constituted (by external 
norms, values, and relationships) and constitutes oneself (by way of self-examination) as a sub-
ject, a process that is clearly characterized by the interconnection of obedience and truth. Insofar 
as this type of relationship comes to permeate modern societies, it makes sense that Foucault 
would later identify it as the basis for the modern hermeneutics of the self and describe the obedi-
ence (internalized as obedience to one’s own reason) that characterizes it as permanent. Hence-
forth, the process through which one constitutes oneself as a subject—through which one both 
accesses and reveals the truth about oneself—occurs within the context of a relationship of per-
manent obedience, where obedience is characterized by self-sacrifice. 
It’s clear that governmentalizing relationships as Foucault describes them are relations of 
power. Indeed, Foucault describes “governmentality” not as a distinct type of power but rather as 
                                                        
3 Foucault, “Governmentality,” 87. 
4 Foucault, “What is Critique?,” 27. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Foucault, “What is Critique?” 
7 Ibid, 26. 
8 Ibid. 
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a set of techniques that function in the service of both disciplinary power and biopower.9 Critique, 
on his view, facilitates negotiation of governmentalizing relationships in ways that do not 
(re)produce self-sacrifice, direction, and management. In fact, Foucault argues that critique 
emerges in response, and is inextricably linked to, the spread of governmentalizing techniques: it 
reflects and in turn asserts concern with the question of “how not to be governed.”10 Rather than 
presenting itself as a simple opposition to the art of governing, this question reflects a concern 
with how to navigate a context characterized by governmentalization in ways that expand the 
field of possible courses of action and modes of thought. This response does not (nor does it aim 
to) avoid or release persons from governance; instead, it gives rise to a different kind of “art,” 
which Foucault calls the “art of not being governed quite so much […] [of not being governed] 
like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by 
means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them.”11 If governmentalization is the 
“movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through 
mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth,” Foucauldian critique functions as the “movement 
by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question 
power on its discourses of truth.”12  
This response to governmentality, then, might also be referred to as an “art of navigating 
power relations.” Such navigation, of course, constitutes the practice of freedom as Foucault con-
ceives of it. Given that power and freedom are mutually constitutive for Foucault, he sees free-
dom as the ability to engage power relations in ways that mediate against and attempt to mini-
mize constraints (such as direction and management) while maximizing capacities. This ability 
shows that persons are not determined by power; it is not that one set of norms and practices 
holds them in intractable states of obedience, subordination, or domination while another facili-
tates their emancipation. Rather, subjects are simultaneously constituted as such and subjugated 
by the same norms and practices, a situation that may complicate, but does not destroy, possibili-
ties for either freedom or subjectivity. The fact that critique is possible not in spite of, but precisely 
due to governmentalization—that it is not distinct from but emerges out of, and in response to, a 
context in which obedience and truth are interconnected—is consistent with Foucault’s view that 
persons do not constitute themselves as solely autonomous or obedient subjects, but rather as 
both simultaneously. Insofar as this is the case, subjects can “give themselves the right” to cri-
tique, a right which is, at the same time, always constrained and which is exercised within a con-
text of constraint.  
                                                        
9 Foucault, “Governmentality.” While Foucault makes clear that disciplinary power and biopower are character-
istic of modern western societies, he also makes it clear that they don’t simply “replace” sovereign power: “[W]e 
need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the 
subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sover-
eignty-discipline-government” (Ibid., 102).  
10 Foucault, “What is Critique?,” 28. 
11 Ibid, 29. 
12 Ibid, 32. 
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In sum, Foucauldian critique—as both philosophical method and self-relational attitude—
responds to an historical context in which the subject’s relationships to itself, others, and truth are 
relationships of obedience and, as such, are relations of (normalizing) power. Critique constitutes 
a way of engaging such a context that does not validate prevailing norms and relations of power, 
but rather inquires into how the current state of affairs came into being, asserts that things can be 
different, endeavors to create conditions for the possibility of change, and actively cultivates al-
ternatives. It is, in other words, a characteristically disobedient, “insubordinate […] desubjugation 
of the subject.”13 
Each of the articles in this special section engages with Foucault’s work politically. Lynne 
Huffer’s, “Foucault’s Fossils: Life Itself and the Return to Nature in Feminist Philosophy,” 
demonstrates that Foucault’s genealogical method undermines and disrupts our settled notions of 
metaphysical and ontological categories. In “Foucault, Laughter, and Gendered Normalization,” 
Emily Douglas examines laughter as a tool of feminist resistance; transgressive laughter disrupts 
gender norms. Heike Schotten’s article, “Against Totalitarianism: Agamben, Foucault, and the 
Politics of Critique,” shows how Foucault’s genealogical method can disrupt settled notions of the 
State, totalitarianism, and morality; this opens up space for emancipatory possibilities. 
In “Foucault’s Fossils: Life Itself and the Return to Nature in Feminist Philosophy,” Lynne 
Huffer examines the turn to nature in recent feminist philosophy. She argues that the return to the 
notion of “life itself” by contemporary feminist philosophers leaves unexamined questions of 
origin. While they hope to construct a posthumanist feminist ethics that does not rely on embat-
tled notions of social constructionism, epistemology and subjectivity, Huffer argues that this re-
turn to nature by feminist philosophers has unexplored implications for subjectivity and ethics. 
Focusing on recent work by Elizabeth Grosz and Judith Butler, Huffer identifies two distinct ways 
that feminists have turned to nature. Grosz re-naturalizes through developing a Darwinian un-
derstanding of nature as dynamic and self-differentiating, whereas Butler is viewed as de-
naturalizer because of her focus on matter as discursive. However, Huffer points out that Butler’s 
later work often refers to life or life itself as an unintelligible force. Thus, feminist re-naturalizers 
and feminist de-naturalizers both end up relying on life as a primary concept from which to build 
a posthumanist ethics. 
Huffer claims that the return to nature advocated by these contemporary feminists runs 
the risk of “universalizing the historically contingent frames of our present world as a new meta-
physics of life,” doing so, she argues undermines their project of conceiving of a posthumanist 
subject because it relies on assumptions that connect “life itself” to the human, and consequently 
does not successfully escape the humanism paradigm. Huffer offers the metaphor of the fossil, 
demonstrating how Foucault’s discussion of fossils and monsters in The Order of Things disrupts 
the frame of life itself as well as humanism. Using Foucault’s method of critique and bringing to-
gether several of his texts, The Lives of Infamous Men, Abnormals, and The Order of Things, Huffer 
convincingly shows that a Foucauldian analysis of the recent return to nature in some contempo-
                                                        
13 Foucault, “What is Critique?” 32. 
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rary feminist philosophy simply repeats a return to metaphysics and origins that feminists and 
other critically minded contemporary theorists have attempted to reject. 
Emily Douglas, in “Foucault, Laughter, and Gendered Normalization,” looks at the trans-
gressive possibilities of laughter for feminists. She begins by pointing out the few places in his 
work where Foucault explicitly talked about laughter, as well as his own laughter in response to 
an interview question, and during his lectures at the College de France. She notes that Foucault 
both used laughter as trangressive, for example, to shatter expectations about gender and sexuali-
ty binaries, and claimed that laughter was powerful. Laughter, as a bodily phenomenon, is nor-
malized and gendered. Douglas draws on feminist Foucauldian and phenomenological analyses 
of female bodily comportment and gender normalization to show how the disciplining of the 
feminine body restricts (or sometimes compels) women’s laughter. Women are sometimes ex-
pected or compelled to laugh, and other times prohibited from laughing. In the times and places 
women are “allowed” to laugh, how they laugh is also regulated: quietly, without too much bodi-
ly movement, and in a feminine way—no guffaws or belly laughs.   
Having shown that laughter is a significant site of normalization and discipline, particular-
ly for the reinforcement of gender norms, Douglas argues that feminists can and should use 
laughter transgressively to disrupt normalizing, gender specific expectations and bodily practices. 
She suggests three ways that feminists can use laughter “to produce anti-normalizing effects: i) 
laughing when we usually wouldn’t; ii) changing our comportment during laughter; and iii) dis-
rupting compulsory laughter (unlaughing).” Each of these is a way of “laughing differently,” a 
way to disrupt the normalized and normalizing gendered expectations and prescriptions that 
women face daily. She concludes by proposing a feminist askesis of laughter whereby feminists 
engage in these transgressive forms of laughter not only to disrupt the expectations and re-
strictions around laughing, but also to engage in transgressive laughing as a way to re-make our 
subjectivity. 
Heike Schotten’s article, “Against Totalitarianism: Agamben, Foucault, and the Politics of 
Critique,” is both a critical response to Georgio Agamben and a positive valuation of the emanci-
patory potential of Foucauldian critique. According to Schotten, Agamben’s work in Homo Sacer 
does not, as Agamben asserts, productively engage with Foucault’s work by correcting his notion 
of biopower. Instead, Schotten argues, Agamben conducts a moralizing “disciplining” of Fou-
cault. Because Agamben adheres to a rigidly defined and ahistorical notion of biopower within 
which Nazism generally and the Holocaust more specifically figure centrally, Schotten contends, 
he can only see the lack of centrality of these phenomena in Foucault’s own conceptualization as a 
failure.  
Contra Agamben, Schotten shows, on the one hand, that Foucauldian genealogy is a 
“methodological choice,” the utilization of which leads Foucault to develop a conceptualization of 
biopower that simply rejects the premises of Agamben’s. On the other hand, she shows that Fou-
cauldian genealogy reflects Foucault’s political commitments to countering the kind of normaliz-
ing, absolutist, and universalizing perspective reflected in Agamben’s work. That is, through il-
lustrating the historically contingent nature of biopower, Foucault makes clear that its normaliz-
Foucault Studies, No. 20, pp. 116-121. 
121 
ing effects need not be uncritically accepted. For Schotten, then, the critical perspective inherent 
within Foucauldian genealogy opens onto emancipatory possibilities that Agamben’s forecloses. 
She focuses specifically on ways in which genealogy’s assertion of what Foucault refers to as 
“subjugated knowledges” functions to disrupt prevailing modes of thought and existence. Schot-
ten draws attention to the irony of Agamben’s explicit claim to speak on behalf of the oppressed 
and his criticism of Foucault for failing to do so when in fact Foucault’s work, as she sees it, both 
stems from and more effectively cultivates the practice of freedom. “As the method of unearthing 
subjugated knowledges,” Schotten writes, genealogy “is the method of critique, the grounds for a 
constant and insurrectionary challenge to ‘what is’.”  
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